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Abstract 
Recent research showed that people recall past-oriented, evaluative feedback more fully and 
accurately than future-oriented, directive feedback. Here we investigated whether these 
memory biases arise from preferential attention toward evaluative feedback during encoding. 
We also attempted to counter the biases via manipulations intended to focus participants on 
improvement. Participants received bogus evaluative and directive feedback on their writing. 
Before reading the feedback, some participants set goals for improvement (experiments 1 and 
2), or they wrote about their past or future use of the writing skills, and/or were incentivised to 
improve (experiment 3); we objectively measured participants’ attention during feedback 
reading using eyetracking. Finally, all participants completed a recall test. We successfully 
replicated the preferential remembering of evaluative feedback, but found little support for an 
attentional explanation. Goal-setting reduced participants’ tendency to reproduce feedback in 
an evaluative style, but not their preferential remembering of evaluative feedback. Neither 
orienting participants toward their past or future use of the writing skills, nor incentivising them 
to improve, influenced their attention toward or memory for the feedback. These findings 
advance the search for a mechanism to explain people’s weaker memory for future-oriented 
feedback, demonstrating that attentional and improvement-oriented accounts cannot 
adequately explain the effect.  
Key words: eyetracking; education; feedback; goal-setting; recall  
Past- and future-oriented feedback  3 
 
Receiving feedback is a crucial part of the learning process (Hattie & Timperley, 
2007; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), and feedback information can take many forms: in some 
cases it is evaluative, focusing on appraising a learner’s past performance; in other cases it is 
directive, focusing on how the learner could improve in future. In a series of recent 
experiments we demonstrated—contrary to our initial predictions—that people were 
consistently worse at remembering directive feedback as compared with evaluative feedback 
(Nash, Winstone, Gregory, & Papps, 2018). In this paper we replicate and extend this 
discovery of an evaluative recall bias in two important ways. First, we use an eyetracking 
method to look for evidence that an attentional mechanism drives this robust bias. Second, we 
examine to what extent three interventions—designed to prompt participants to consider 
improving their performance—would counter the bias. 
Memory for feedback 
Regardless of the form that feedback takes, if learners are to be able to apply it in 
future contexts, then it is often important for them first to be able to remember it. This role 
for memory is especially crucial when we consider that students frequently say they read 
written feedback only briefly, and only once (Gibbs & Simpson, 2004; Robinson, Pope, & 
Holyoak, 2013; Winstone, Nash, Parker, & Rowntree, 2017; Winstone, Nash, Rowntree, & 
Parker, 2017). In assessment contexts where there are objective correct or incorrect 
answers—for example in a general knowledge or multiple-choice quiz— we know that 
receiving feedback prior to a second test of the same material can generally enable learners to 
improve their performance (e.g. Butler, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2008; Butler & Roediger, 
2008; Kang, McDermott, & Roediger, 2007; Phye & Sanders, 1994; Shute, 2008). Yet we 
also know that people easily forget even these straightforward and unambiguous kinds of 
feedback, which can often lead to them making the same errors for a second time. For 
example, whilst completing a multiple-choice test, some of the participants in Butler and 
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Roediger’s (2008) study received corrective feedback on each of their responses, either 
immediately or at the end of the test. One week later, they took a cued recall test of the same 
study material. Despite having been explicitly informed of the correct answer for every error 
they had made in the multiple-choice test, in the cued recall test participants nevertheless still 
gave incorrect answers around half of the time. Further, in many learning contexts, there is no 
such ‘correct’ answer, and therefore much of the feedback that learners receive is descriptive, 
guided by the feedback-giver’s subjective appraisals of the merits of the work. The extent to 
which people can remember detailed, descriptive feedback comments like these, has received 
almost no empirical scrutiny. 
Recently we investigated this issue by testing the extent to which people are capable 
of reproducing evaluative and directive feedback comments from memory (Nash et al., 
2018). In our initial experiments, participants completed a persuasive writing task, and later 
they received detailed feedback about their performance. The feedback, although presented to 
participants with the suggestion that it was personalized, was in fact generic, and all 
participants received the same substantive comments. We presented each critical comment to 
different participants either in an evaluative style, written in a past-oriented manner (e.g. “you 
didn't always think about possible counterarguments to your position and defend against 
them”), or in a directive style, written in a future-oriented manner (“you could try to think 
more about possible counterarguments to your position and defend against them”). All 
participants saw a mixture of evaluative and directive comments, with each individual 
comment seen by half of participants in an evaluative style and by half of participants in a 
directive style. A short while after reading this feedback, participants completed a surprise 
recall test, in which they were asked to reproduce as much of the feedback as possible. We 
measured not only which statements the participants recalled, but also the style in which they 
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recalled them (i.e. whether they recalled a directive piece of feedback in a correct directive 
style or in an incorrect evaluative style). 
Based on evidence from the feedback and memory literatures, for several reasons our 
prediction was that participants would recall more directive feedback than evaluative 
feedback. Firstly, students typically report a preference to receive feedback about future 
improvement rather than feedback about how they performed in the past (Carless, 2006; 
Dawson et al., 2019; Winstone, Nash, Rowntree, & Menezes, 2016), and we know that 
people are typically better able to remember information if they had been interested in finding 
it out (Fastrich, Kerr, Castel, & Murayama, 2018). Secondly, feedback and remembering are 
both fundamentally future-oriented processes: they both serve to guide future planning and 
execution of tasks (Klein, 2013; Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
Some studies, for example, have demonstrated enhanced memory for word lists when 
participants attempt to associate the to-be-learned words with future plans, rather than with 
memories of past events (Klein et al., 2010; Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2011). Finally, key 
findings from the implementation intentions literature—wherein people are more likely to 
successfully memorize instructions if they believe they will be asked to implement them 
later—also led us to predict a memory advantage for feedback comments that provide future-
oriented instructions (e.g. Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
McDaniel, Howard, & Butler, 2008). 
However, in our studies we consistently found the opposite pattern to the one we 
predicted: participants recalled more evaluative feedback than directive feedback – a pattern 
that we termed the evaluative recall bias (Nash et al., 2018). This unexpected finding is all 
the more intriguing in light of the fact that when asked, most of Nash et al.’s (2018) 
participants claimed to prefer receiving directive feedback. This memory bias is compounded 
by a further effect whereby participants frequently tended to reproduce the feedback 
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comments from memory in an evaluative style, even when the comments had originally been 
directive. This latter bias—which we termed an evaluative retrieval style—is important 
because systematic patterns of misremembering can inform us about the kinds of inferences 
people make when processing information (e.g. Brewer, 1977; Chan & McDermott, 2006). 
The bias may reflect a tendency for people to infer criticisms about their past performance 
when receiving advice about how to improve in future. If so, then in practice this bias may 
result in students feeling that the feedback they received was negative rather than 
constructive, potentially leading to demotivation (Fong et al., 2016).  
At present, despite extensive investigation of several candidate mechanisms (Nash et 
al., 2018) there is no clear explanation for why the evaluative recall bias occurs. In this paper, 
we develop two avenues of further investigation. 
The role of attention 
It is possible that the evaluative recall bias is driven by preferential attention toward 
evaluative feedback at the point of its encoding, rather than by memory processes per se, and 
that this preferential attention could be responsible for the effects subsequently seen in 
remembering. For example, although students often claim to have greater interest in directive 
feedback than in evaluative feedback, research from the economic psychology literature tells 
us that people tend to be strongly driven to obtain information about their prior performance, 
even when doing so is irrational in economic terms (Alós-Ferrer, García-Segarra, & Ritschel, 
2018). If this finding applies to processing of feedback then it would lead us to predict that 
people should habitually pay preferential attention to evaluative feedback comments. 
Two findings from Nash et al. (2018) seem to point against an attentional 
interpretation, but the evidence in both cases is far from conclusive. First, Nash et al. found 
no significant memory advantage for evaluative feedback over directive when participants 
were tested using a recognition test instead of a recall test (Experiments 1 and 2). This 
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finding might suggest that both kinds are encoded similarly in memory. However, Nash et al. 
only gathered recognition data in two relatively small experiments, and in one of these 
experiments there was still a moderate (but nonsignificant) recognition advantage in favour of 
evaluative feedback. Secondly, in a between-subjects design, participants who received only 
evaluative feedback spent an equivalent total amount of time reading to those participants 
who received only directive feedback (Experiment 4). This finding might suggest that 
participants paid equal attention to the feedback regardless of its written style. However, 
participants completed this experiment within a rather uncontrolled classroom environment 
that involved considerable distraction, and their reading times were measured only indirectly 
via their web browsers. This meant that there was likely considerable noise in the reading 
time data, which make these statistical comparisons difficult to interpret. Furthermore, a 
preferential attention mechanism could rely on relative rather than absolute attention. That is 
to say, people might pay less attention to directive feedback only when their attention is 
drawn by evaluative feedback. If so, then a between-subjects design cannot allow an 
attentional mechanism to be ruled out. In sum, it would be premature to draw theoretical 
conclusions about the possible role of attention in the evaluative recall bias based on the data 
published to date. To draw firmer conclusions, it is essential to use more reliable and direct 
measures of attention. 
One objective and direct method of measuring attention at encoding is to track 
participants’ eye gaze during reading. This approach would enable us to directly compare 
how long participants spend reading evaluative feedback comments relative to the interleaved 
directive comments. Whereas it is important to note that reading time does not necessarily 
equate to attention— for example,  participants could be spending their time engaged in 
mind-wandering (Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2013)—nevertheless eyetracking does provide 
an important step in testing an attentional account.  
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The role of improvement focus 
Whether or not an attentional account of the evaluative recall bias holds, one might 
reason that this bias would not occur if greater emphasis were placed upon the importance of 
performing well. Put differently, the evaluative recall bias may rely on participants giving 
little consideration to the prospect of improving their skills, and so having little reason to 
attend to or mentally rehearse future-oriented, directive feedback comments. Indeed, in all of 
Nash et al.’s (2018) experiments, participants either knew that the feedback they received 
was not self-relevant (Experiments 3-6), or they were told it was self-relevant, yet given little 
reason to think that improving their performance would benefit them (Experiments 1-2).  
If this lack of improvement focus is important, then one way to counter these memory 
biases might be to prompt participants to explicitly consider their skill improvement, which 
should in principle increase the goal-relevance of directive feedback, and could therefore 
promote their attention toward and memory for this information (e.g. Montagrin, Brosch, & 
Sander, 2013). When participants in Nash et al. (2018, Experiment 2) were explicitly advised 
to find out what they could improve, they appeared to spend longer reading the feedback 
overall, yet the evaluative recall bias was not reduced. However, simply telling people to 
heed advice about how to improve does not necessarily cause them to want to improve, or to 
perceive any value to this future-oriented information. We might expect that striving for the 
latter priorities would be a more effective way of undermining the evaluative recall bias.  
In the present experiments, we therefore attempted to manipulate participants’ focus 
on self-improvement, by using three different interventions immediately before they received 
their feedback: (1) requiring participants to set themselves goals for improving on the second 
writing task; (2) requiring them to reflect on how their writing skills had been valuable in the 
past, or would be valuable in the future; and (3) offering a performance-related monetary 
incentive. 
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Experiment 1 
 Here we investigated participants’ memory for evaluative versus directive feedback, 
and for the first time we used eyetracking to provide a direct measure of attentional processes 
during participants’ encoding of the feedback. If participants were found to spend relatively 
more time reading evaluative than directive feedback, then this would suggest that at least 
part of the evaluative recall bias is attributable to attentional mechanisms.  
 In addition to measuring visual attention, we also used a goal-setting intervention to 
test the prediction that the evaluative recall bias and/or retrieval style would be reduced or 
reversed when participants reflected (prior to receiving feedback) on how to improve their 
own performance. Goal-setting and action planning are considered especially vital in the 
context of learning and self-regulation, and have been conceptualized as central skills 
underpinning learners’ ability to use feedback effectively (Latham & Locke, 1991; Locke & 
Latham, 2002; Winstone, Nash, Parker, et al., 2017). People’s immediate goals have been 
found to direct both their allocation of attentional resources (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; 
Moskowitz, 2002; Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2010), and the 
subsequent memorability of goal-relevant material (Montagrin et al., 2013). Further, previous 
research demonstrates that manipulating participants’ goals can influence qualitative aspects 
of remembering processes (e.g. Ikeda, Castel, & Murayama, 2015; Mangels, Rodriguez, 
Ochakovskaya, & Guerra-Carrillo, 2017; Murayama & Elliot, 2011), as well as affecting 
academic outcomes (Morisano, Hirsh, Peterson, Pihl, & Shore, 2010). It is therefore plausible 
that encouraging participants to set goals, and thus to actively reflect on their own self-
improvement, would in turn reduce the evaluative recall bias and retrieval style. Further, we 
might also expect that goal-setting should lead participants to pay relatively more attention to 
directive feedback, as compared with participants who do not set goals, due to the increased 
goal-relevance of this directive information among the former group. 
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Method 
Participants and design.  
Based on a priori power analysis using G*Power, we estimated that 128 participants 
would be required to detect a medium-sized between-subjects effect in our study design, 
assuming power = .80, f = .25, and alpha = .05. A total of 128 students therefore took part in 
exchange for either £10 or for course credit. One participant was excluded from the final 
analysis because they failed to follow instructions on the memory task, and they were 
replaced with a new participant. The final sample comprised 99 females and 29 males, Mage = 
22 years, SD = 4 years, range = 18–45. In the second session of the experiment, each 
participant was randomly assigned either to the Control condition (n = 65) or the Goal-setting 
condition (n = 63), as explained below.  
Materials 
Feedback scripts. During the experiment each participant received at random one of 
two versions of a script of standardized feedback, as used previously by Nash et al. (2018). 
These scripts totalled 418 words (version A) and 411 words (version B) respectively, and 
were divided into three subsections titled “substance”, “style”, and “format,” with each 
subsection containing critical feedback comments prefixed and suffixed by points of praise. 
The praise was not relevant to the present aims, but was intended solely to make the feedback 
seem less severe and more realistic.  
Each feedback script contained 20 critique comments in total, which were presented 
in the same order to every participant. In both scripts half of the critique comments were 
written in an evaluative style: presented as comments about the essays written by the 
participant, and were thus focused on past performance. The other half of the critique 
comments were written in a directive style: presented as comments about what the participant 
could improve in a subsequent assignment, and were thus focused on future performance. 
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The written style of each individual comment was counterbalanced across the two scripts. We 
achieved this style manipulation by minimally re-wording each critique comment, thus 
maintaining the same general meaning using the evaluative and directive styles, while 
keeping the comments’ length and complexity approximately equal. For example, half of 
participants were told, “You did not always try to provoke your reader’s thinking, and 
focused instead on arguments that they would expect” (i.e., evaluative), whereas the other 
half were told “You could try to provoke your reader's thinking more, by focusing on 
arguments that they would find unexpected” (i.e., directive). We presented the critique 
comments in pairs that alternated between the evaluative and directive style throughout each 
feedback script. 
Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI: Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Directive 
feedback overtly relates to future learning and evaluative feedback to past performance; 
therefore memory biases may plausibly relate to individual differences in participants’ 
general time orientation. For exploratory purposes, all participants completed the ZTPI, a 
frequently used measure of trait differences in people’s relative orientation toward the past, 
present, and future. The ZTPI comprises 56 statements that participants rate on 5-point Likert 
scales (1 = very untrue; 5 = very true). These 56 items make up five subscales: Past-Negative, 
Past-Positive, Present-Hedonistic, Present-Fatalistic, and Future (an example item: “I try to 
live my life as fully as possible, one day at a time”). Published internal reliability estimates 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for the five subscales range from 0.74 to 0.82 (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), 
which confirms that this measure is reliable.  
Achievement Goal Questionnaire—Revised (AGQ-R). For exploratory purposes, all 
participants completed a task-adapted version of the AGQ-R, a measure of trait achievement 
goals (Elliot & Murayama, 2008). The AGQ-R comprises 12 items that participants rate on 5-
point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). The measure contains four 
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subscales (3 items per scale) that distinguish mastery goal orientations (i.e., developing 
competence relative to an absolute or intrapersonal standard) from performance goal 
orientations (i.e., developing competence relative to other people or to a normative standard), 
and distinguish approach goal orientations (i.e., focusing on success) from avoidance goal 
orientations (i.e., focusing on preventing failure). Published internal reliability estimates 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for the four subscales range from 0.84 to 0.94 (Elliot & Murayama, 
2008), confirming a high degree of reliability.  Small adaptations to the wording of the 
individual AGQ-R items were made, such that the items referred to the writing task used 
within this study (e.g. “My goal was to avoid performing poorly on the persuasive writing 
task”).  
Procedure. 
Participants signed up for a study purportedly investigating “Personality and 
persuasive writing.” Each participant individually attended two sessions in the laboratory 
spaced 2 days apart. 
Session 1. We presented all instructions and information on a computer screen using 
an online tool (Qualtrics). To begin, participants were asked to complete a persuasive writing 
task consisting of four short essays. Participants chose four topics from a list of ten 
contentious titles (e.g. “Should students have to pay for their university education?”). Next, 
one of the four chosen titles was displayed on the computer screen at random, and the 
participant was asked to type a short persuasive essay on that topic within a time limit of 5 
minutes. A countdown timer at the top of the page indicated how much time was remaining. 
After 5 minutes, the page automatically changed, and a new essay title appeared from those 
the participant initially chose. This process was repeated for all four essay titles, with a total 
duration of 20 minutes. Participants then completed the ZTPI, before being reminded that 
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their persuasive essays would be examined prior to the second session, and that during that 
session they would receive detailed feedback on their essays. Participants were told, falsely, 
that this feedback would be intended to help them to complete a second writing task in 
session 2, and they were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed that “I am looking 
forwards to receiving my feedback when I return for session 2” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree). 
Session 2. On returning 2 days later, participants were informed that they would be 
given their feedback after completing a short task. At this point, the computer software 
pseudo-randomly assigned the participant to either the Goal-setting condition or the Control 
condition. Following the same principles as Avery and Smillie's, (2013) mastery-goal 
induction, Goal-setting participants were informed via text on the computer screen that the 
feedback they would shortly receive was designed to help them develop their skills, and that 
they should use the feedback to understand how to do so. Before seeing the feedback, they 
were asked to think of and type three goals that they could set themselves for improving in 
the upcoming second writing task. The computer screen presented three text boxes, and 
participants were required to type one goal in each box, without a time limit. Control 
participants, in contrast, were told nothing specific about the purpose of the feedback, except 
that they would receive it shortly. To equate approximately for the time taken by Goal-setting 
participants to complete the goals task, Control participants were asked to think of three 
interesting things that they might see on their journey back from the experiment, and to type 
short descriptions of these things into three text boxes on their computer screen. In short, all 
participants were asked to think about the near future, with only those in the Goal-setting 
condition asked to reflect specifically on their skills and goals in this writing context. 
 To receive the feedback, participants next moved to a separate computer, so that their 
eye movements and fixations could be measured. We used an Eyelink 1000 (SR Research, 
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Ontario, Canada), which is a video-based (infrared) eye-tracker, to record participants’ eye 
position with accuracy of approximately 0.5° and a sampling rate of 2000 Hz. Participants 
placed their head on a chinrest in front of a LCD 22-inch monitor (resolution 1920 x 1080 
pixels), at a viewing distance of 80 cm. A standard 9-dot calibration was first performed to 
ensure the correct recording of eye movements with maximum recording error of 1°; no 
further drift check was included. Once this calibration was complete, participants were then 
shown the feedback script that they had been randomly assigned, presented using Experiment 
Builder software (V1.10.1630). The feedback script was presented on three separate screen-
pages, to ensure that the visual resolution of the text was sufficient to permit reliable 
eyetracking. Participants could move through the three pages at their own pace using arrows 
on the keyboard, and were permitted to go back and review previously viewed sections if 
they wished, before exiting the programme using the right arrow key after reading the final 
page.  
After reading the feedback, participants completed the adapted AGQ—R 
questionnaire (Elliot & Murayama, 2008)before completing a 5-minute distracter task of 
logic puzzles. Participants were subsequently presented with a surprise memory test, in which 
they were given up to 10 mins to type as much of the feedback as they could remember; they 
were not permitted to move on until at least 5 mins had passed. The instructions explained 
that we did not require the feedback to be recalled verbatim, but that participants should try to 
convey the meaning of what was written.  
Finally, participants were asked to rate the feedback overall in terms of its fairness (1 
= very unfair; 5 = very fair) and helpfulness (1 = very unhelpful; 5 = very helpful), and then 
asked to estimate what percentage grade they might have received in the persuasive writing 
task, and what grade they might be able to achieve next time in light of the feedback. They 
were asked to provide any comments they had about the feedback, to guess the aim of the 
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study, and to choose which type of feedback they preferred to receive (feedback that tells me 
how I have performed; feedback that tells me what I should do next time; neither/ no 
preference).  
Data processing. 
Adherence to task instructions. We checked participants’ responses to the 
intervening task (i.e., either setting improvement goals, or describing things they might see 
on their way home) to ensure they had followed instructions. Four Control participants 
misunderstood the instructions and instead wrote about what they might see during the 
remainder of the experiment; further, one wrote about what they had seen on their way to the 
experiment, and one wrote responses unrelated to the task. However, because this control task 
served primarily only as a time-filler, all of these participants were included in the final 
analysis. More importantly, all Goal-setting participants adhered to the task instructions by 
describing three goals for improvement; all participants were included in the final analysis.  
Memory coding. One researcher coded the free recall data, blind to which script each 
participant had seen and to which experimental condition they were assigned. Specifically, 
the researcher coded which of the 20 feedback comments each participant had recalled, and 
whether each comment was recalled in an evaluative style or a directive style. Note that as 
per the instructions given to participants, these free recall data were recalled at the gist level 
such that, for example, a participant who wrote ‘Be concise’ would be coded as having 
successfully retrieved the feedback comment ‘The way you make your points could be more 
concise’. Participants occasionally recalled certain pieces of feedback in both an evaluative 
and in a directive style; in these cases, the feedback comment was coded twice (i.e. once in 
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the directive style and once in the evaluative style)1. Any praise that participants recalled was 
ignored. After subsequently revealing which feedback script each participant actually saw, 
this coding approach therefore enabled us to establish four distinct measurements for each 
participant: (1) the number of evaluative feedback comments recalled in the correct, 
evaluative style; (2) the number of directive comments recalled in the correct, directive style; 
(3) the number of evaluative comments recalled in the incorrect, directive style; and (4) the 
number of directive comments recalled in the incorrect, evaluative style. To ensure the 
reliability of the coding, an independent coder also coded 20% of these data (also blind to the 
script and experimental condition). The agreement rates were high for all four of these 
interval-level measurements (all r > .92), and so all analyses of recall were based on the first 
coder’s data. 
Eyetracking. Interest areas were defined for each individual word in the critique 
comments of the feedback scripts, and each of these interest areas was categorized either as 
evaluative or directive, according to the written style of the full sentence within which it 
featured. For each interest area we recorded the total time (ms) spent looking at each word 
(hereafter, dwell time), and the number of times each word was fixated upon (hereafter, run 
count). For run count a value of 1 implies that the word was read once and not returned to – 
note that this is different from ‘fixation count’ in that run count only measures how many 
times a word was looked at, not how many individual fixations were involved in reading 
                                                          
1 Here and in both subsequent experiments, these double-coded statements were in the small minority 
(Experiment 1, 4.1% of the total number of statements recalled were double coded; in Experiment 2 
this was again 4.1%, and in Experiment 3 it was 1.5%). None of the statistical findings reported in this 
paper were changed if rather than coding these statements twice, we instead excluded them from 
coding entirely. 
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individual words. For analysis, we averaged each of these variables separately for all 
evaluative and for all directive feedback comments, such that for each participant we 
calculated a single mean dwell time and a single mean run count for all evaluative comments 
combined, and the same for all directive comments combined. These mean values therefore 
equate for the slightly unequal number of words used for each feedback type, as well as the 
slightly unequal length of the feedback scripts. These mean dwell time and mean run count 
values were used in the analyses below. Dwell time and run count values are highly 
correlated, however we used both because they provide qualitatively different information 
about participants’ reading patterns.  
We checked the eyetracking data from each participant prior to inferential analysis, to 
ensure that the scan path corresponded with the predefined interest areas. This is often a 
requirement in eyetracking research due to the imperfect nature of the eyetracking software 
(Cohen, 2013). When reading English text, eye-gaze scan paths follow a clear pattern left to 
right and then a large leap down and across to the left to start the next sentence; therefore 
when the tracking is imperfect, it is possible to tell where the appropriate fixation location for 
the read words and sentence should be (Cohen, 2013). Fixations were therefore corrected 
manually in SR Research’s Data Viewer software, using the drift correct function. Due to the 
short study duration and the large variation in the accurate recording of the scan path even 
within individual participants, this drift correction was conducted manually instead of using 
an automated process (Cohen, 2013). Further, due to the size of the lettering used and the 
narrow interest areas, some participants’ fixations fell above or below the appropriate interest 
area for the word that they were fixating; in such cases we adjusted the interest areas in Data 
Viewer to properly accommodate their eye gaze, which led to a small, systematic, shift up or 
down of all interest areas for the participant. That is to say, the same correction was applied 
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to the entire feedback script for each individual participant, where necessary, rather than 
different corrections being applied to each individual feedback comment. 
Results  
Analytic approach. In all three experiments described here, main results are reported 
using standard null hypothesis significance testing, and also with Bayesian analysis 
conducted using default priors in JASP (JASP Team, 2018). Bayesian analysis allows us to 
test the relative likelihood of the alternative hypothesis being supported versus the null 
hypothesis, given the data obtained. With complex study designs such as ours, a large number 
of candidate models are tested (i.e., in JASP, the 2x2x2 design here results in 18 candidate 
models). Therefore, to consider all of the evidence in support of specific main effects and 
interaction effects, we take a Bayesian model averaging approach for all omnibus tests. 
whereby all of these candidate models that include a specific effect are averaged in JASP 
using the 'effects’ output option (across matched models; see Wagenmakers et al., 2018 for 
further details of this process).  
The Bayes Factors obtained from these averaged models can be interpreted as 
signifying the degree of evidence (BFinclusion) in support of those models that include each 
specific main effect or interaction effect, relative to equivalent models that exclude that 
effect. When BFinclusion for an effect is equal to 1, the data lend equal support to the existence 
of that effect (H1) and to there being a null effect (H0). When BFinclusion  is between 1 and 3, 
this is considered anecdotal support for H1; BFinclusion between 3 and 10 signify moderate 
evidence, BFinclusion between 10 and 30 signifies strong evidence, and BFinclusion above 30 
signifies very strong evidence for H1. In contrast, anecdotal support for H0 is indicated when 
BFinclusion is between 0.33 and 1; BFinclusion between 0.1 and 0.33 signify moderate evidence, 
BFinclusion between 0.03 and 0.1 signifies strong evidence, and BFinclusion below 0.03 signifies 
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very strong evidence for H0. For follow-up t-tests, BF10 is the relevant outcome statistic 
instead of BFinclusion; the same interpretations of these Bayes Factor values apply. 
Participants’ appraisals of the feedback. Most of our participants appeared 
unsuspicious about the suggestion that the feedback was personalised. In fact, only two 
spontaneously mentioned that they thought the feedback was generic. Participants rated the 
feedback highly in both fairness (M = 4.12 out of 5, SD = 0.81), and helpfulness (M = 4.15, 
SD = 0.68). They also believed that engaging with the feedback would allow them to do 
better in the future, so that whereas the average estimated grade for the initial writing was 
52.51% (SD = 9.86) participants believed that this could increase to 66.12% (SD = 9.09) in 
the anticipated second writing task. None of the participants correctly guessed the 
experiment’s aims, nor mentioned the differences in feedback style when prompted to guess. 
Interestingly, 76% of participants told us at the end of the experiment that in general they 
preferred to receive directive feedback, whereas only 21% said they preferred to receive 
evaluative feedback (the remaining 3% expressed no preference either way). 
Analysis of recall data. To test our main predictions about memory for the feedback, 
we calculated a 2 (between subjects: condition: Goal-setting vs. Control) x 2 (within subjects: 
feedback type: evaluative vs. directive) x 2 (within subjects: retrieval style accuracy: correct 
vs. incorrect) mixed-factorial ANOVA on the number of feedback comments recalled. This 
analysis will confirm whether we replicated our previous findings of an evaluative recall bias 
and an evaluative retrieval style (Nash et al., 2018). Specifically, evidence of an evaluative 
recall bias would be revealed via a significant main effect of feedback type, whereby 
participants recalled more evaluative feedback comments than directive feedback comments. 
Furthermore, evidence of an evaluative retrieval style would be revealed via a significant 
interaction between feedback type and retrieval style accuracy, whereby evaluative comments 
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are reproduced in the correct (evaluative) style proportionately more often than directive 
comments are reproduced in the correct (directive) style.  
Figure 1 about here. 
Crucially, as Figure 1 shows, the analysis replicated the key patterns of findings 
demonstrated previously by Nash et al. (2018). That is to say, there was a significant 
evaluative recall bias, such that participants recalled more of the evaluative feedback (M = 
4.59, SD = 1.67) than of the directive feedback (M = 3.27, SD = 1.55), F(1, 126) = 50.00, p < 
.001, η2p = .28 (BFinclusion > 30). There was also a main effect of retrieval style accuracy, 
whereby participants recalled more feedback comments in the correct, original style (M = 
4.98, SD = 1.94) than in the incorrect, opposite style (M = 2.88, SD = 1.55), F(1, 126) = 
90.39, p < .001, η2p = .42 (BFinclusion > 30). We also found a significant interaction between 
feedback type and retrieval style accuracy, thus signifying an evaluative retrieval style, F(1, 
126) = 41.69, p < .001, η2p = .25 (BFinclusion > 30). Follow-up paired t-tests showed that when 
participants recalled evaluative comments, they reproduced them in an evaluative style 
significantly more often (76% of the time) than in a directive style (24% of the time), t(127) 
= 9.89, p < .001, d = 0.87 (BF10 > 30). In contrast, when participants recalled directive 
comments, they reproduced these in the correct, directive style no more often (45% of the 
time) than in the incorrect, evaluative style (55% of the time), t(127) = -1.29, p = .20, d = -
0.11 (BF10 = 0.22). 
 Looking next to the effects of goal-setting, we found that participants who completed 
the Goal-setting intervention did not significantly differ from those in the Control condition 
in terms of how much feedback they recalled overall, F(1, 126) = 0.32, p = .57, η2p < .01 
(BFinclusion = 0.11). There was also no significant interaction between retrieval style accuracy 
and goal-setting condition, which tells us that both groups were similarly able to recall the 
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feedback comments in their original style, F(1, 126) = 1.97, p = .16, η2p = .02 (BFinclusion = 
0.24). However, of greater relevance to our main hypotheses, we also found that goal-setting 
condition did not interact significantly with feedback type, F(1, 126) = 0.49, p = .49, η2p < .01 
(BFinclusion = 0.30), which suggests that the goal-setting manipulation had minimal effect on 
the evaluative recall bias. 
There was, however, a significant three-way interaction between condition, feedback 
type, and retrieval style accuracy, signifying that the goal-setting intervention had a 
statistically significant effect upon participants’ retrieval styles, F(1, 126) = 6.13, p = .01, η2p 
= .05 (BFinclusion > 30). As Figure 1 shows, and in line with our predictions, participants in the 
Goal-setting condition demonstrated a smaller evaluative retrieval style, than did those in the 
Control condition. When analysing the data from the Control condition alone, we found a 
large significant interaction between feedback type and retrieval style recall accuracy, F(1, 
64) = 55.13, p < .001, η2p = .46 (BFinclusion > 30). Of the evaluative feedback recalled in this 
condition, participants reproduced 84% in an evaluative style, but of the directive feedback 
recalled, they reproduced just 40% in a directive style. When analysing data from the Goal-
setting condition alone, we again found a statistically significant interaction between 
feedback type and retrieval style recall accuracy, F(1, 62) = 6.13, p = .02, η2p = .09 (BFinclusion 
> 30), but the effect size for the latter was notably smaller than in the Control condition. This 
means that participants in the Goal-setting condition still demonstrated an overall tendency to 
reproduce feedback comments in an evaluative style, but that this tendency was less 
pronounced than in the Control condition. Of the evaluative feedback recalled in this Goal-
setting condition, participants reproduced 68% in an evaluative style, but of the directive 
feedback recalled, they reproduced 51% in a directive style. In short, setting goals for 
improvement seemed to have little effect on which or how much feedback the participants 
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remembered, but it did influence how they remembered this feedback, with a significant but 
incomplete reduction in the evaluative retrieval style 
Analysis of attention data. There were 115 participants with valid eyetracking data 
(60 Control; 55 Goal-setting). We analysed each of the two dependent variables (dwell time 
and run count) using 2 (between subjects: condition) x 2 (within subjects: feedback type) 
mixed-factor ANOVAs. We look first to the average dwell time data, which tell us how long 
on average participants spent reading each word of feedback in evaluative vs. directive 
comments. As Figure 2a shows, crucially we found no significant main effect of feedback 
type in these data, F(1, 113) = 2.46, p = .12, η2p = .02 (BFinclusion = 0.43), such that 
participants spent approximately equal amounts of time reading directive feedback comments 
(M = 244 ms/word, SD = 93) and evaluative comments (M = 239 ms/word, SD = 86). There 
was also no significant main effect of condition, F(1, 113) = 1.02, p = .32, η2p < .01 
(BFinclusion = 0.64), nor a significant interaction between feedback type and condition, F(1, 
113) = 0.49, p = .49, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.24). In short, these results suggest that the goal-
setting intervention did not notably affect participants’ attention to the feedback. 
We next looked to the run count data, which tell us how many times participants read 
each word of feedback on average. As shown in Figure 2b, we found no significant main 
effect of feedback type, F(1, 113) = 0.48, p = .49, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.18), which suggests 
that participants read the words of evaluative comments (M = 0.98, SD = 0.32) and of 
directive comments (M = 0.99, SD = 0.37) an approximately equal number of times. There 
was no significant main effect of condition, F(1, 113) = 0.37, p = .54, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 
0.55), nor a significant interaction between feedback type and condition, F(1, 113) = 0.00, p 
= .96, η2p < .001 (BFinclusion = 0.21). Again, these data show that the goal-setting intervention 
has no discernible effect on participants’ attention toward the feedback. 
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Exploratory analyses. We examined group differences in participants’ ratings of the 
feedback’s fairness and helpfulness, their grading of their actual and expected performance, 
and their AGQ-R scores. We also analysed the extent to which individual participants’ ZTPI 
and AGQ-R scores, their ratings of their interest in receiving the feedback, and their 
preference for evaluative vs. directive feedback, were associated with their (1) evaluative 
recall bias, (2) evaluative retrieval style, (3) selective attention toward evaluative feedback in 
terms of dwell time and run count. The results of these analyses are reported in supplemental 
materials, but there were few effects of note. 
Figure 2 about here 
Discussion 
Our data replicate the evaluative recall bias for written feedback as reported in our 
previous work (Nash et al., 2018). They also suggest that this bias is not easily attributable to 
participants paying differential attention to evaluative versus directive feedback, nor was the 
bias reduced by a goal-setting intervention. The goal-setting intervention did, however, 
attenuate a secondary bias – the evaluative retrieval style. Specifically, after setting goals for 
improvement, participants were more likely to reproduce their feedback in a directive style 
than were those in the control group (whilst nevertheless still demonstrating a small and 
statistically significant evaluative retrieval style overall).  
Reflecting on how goal-setting affected participants’ retrieval styles, it is possible that 
the goal-setting task prompted participants to construe the feedback comments more as 
constructive advice (i.e., as directive), rather than as criticisms of their performance (i.e., as 
evaluative). It is also possible, though, that writing goals simply primed participants to write 
in a future-oriented style when subsequently completing the recall task. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2 we attempted to replicate the findings of Experiment 1, and to tease apart these 
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two competing explanations of the effect of goal-setting on participants’ retrieval style. We 
did so by adding a third condition to our design in which prior to receiving their feedback, 
participants wrote advice for a hypothetical person who was going on vacation. This third 
task, in principle, could prime a directive writing style, but should not encourage participants 
to construe the feedback comments differently than would control participants.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
 To enhance the robustness and replicability of our findings, we pre-registered our 
method and analysis plan for Experiment 2, which can be found at 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=v27kz7 
Participants and design.  
Based on a priori power analysis using parameters estimated from Experiment 1, we 
estimated that 168 participants would be required to detect the 3 x 2 x 2 within-between 
interaction effect in our study design, assuming power = .80 and alpha = .05. A total of 168 
students therefore took part in exchange for £10 or for course credit. Following our pre-
registered protocol, one participant was excluded from analyses due to late completion of 
Session 2, and was replaced with a new participant. The final sample comprised 139 females 
and 29 males, Mage = 20 yrs, SD = 3 yrs, range = 18 – 45. In the second session of the 
experiment, each participant (n = 56 per condition) was randomly assigned either to the 
Control condition, the Advice-giving condition, or to the Goal-setting condition, as explained 
below. 
Materials  
Feedback scripts. As in Experiment 1, participants were presented at random with a 
version of our feedback scripts. Here, to further establish the replicability of the effects across 
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different materials, we developed a new feedback script (script 2), which we presented to half 
of the participants, while the script we had used in Experiment 1 (script 1) was presented to 
the other half. We prepared script 2 according to the same specifications of script 1 and so 
there were again two versions of script 2, which can be found in the online supplemental 
materials—both contained 20 critique comments and totalled 415 words (version A) and 407 
words (version B). 
Adapted Temporal Focus Scale (TFS). In this experiment, rather than using the 
lengthy ZTPI as in Experiment 1, we instead used a much shorter time perspective inventory 
that focuses on state, rather than trait time perspective; specifically, we adapted the TFS 
(Shipp, Edwards, & Lambert, 2009). The original TFS comprises 12 statements related to 
temporal focus, each of which is rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Never; 7 = Constantly). 
The statements ask to what extent individuals attend towards the past, present or future. We 
adapted this scale to focus only on how they thought about the past or future (i.e., excluding 
the present) during the attention-based filler task (see below), and so we used only eight 
items: I thought about things from my past (past); I thought about what my future has in store 
(future); I focused on my future (future); I replayed memories of the past in my mind (past); I 
imagined what tomorrow will bring for me (future); I reflected on what has happened in my 
life (past); I thought back to my earlier days (past); I thought about times to come (future). 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire—Revised (AGQ-R). Again, all participants 
completed our adapted version of the AGQ-R (Elliot & Murayama, 2008). 
Filler task. Here, we used an alternative filler task to the one used in Experiment 1. 
This was a repetitive attention task, where participants had to respond using the left and right 
arrow keys to an asterisk that appeared to the left or the right of a central line. This task was 
chosen as it is an example of a simplistic, undemanding task, which are known to evoke 
Past- and future-oriented feedback  26 
 
mind-wandering (e.g. Baird et al., 2012; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). Using the 
TFS we could then measure to what extent any mind-wandering that occurred was directed 
more towards the past or the future.  
Procedure.  
The procedure matched that of Experiment 1, except for a few small details, as 
follows.  
Session 1. We removed the ZTPI questionnaire from Session 1. We also removed the 
final question in which participants reported whether they were looking forwards to receiving 
the feedback. All other aspects were identical to Experiment 1.  
Session 2. Participants returned 2 days later for the second session, in which they 
were presented with a short task prior to seeing their feedback. The computer software 
pseudo-randomly assigned the participants to one of three conditions: either the Goal-setting 
condition or the Control condition, as per Experiment 1, or a third, Advice-giving condition. 
In the Advice-giving condition, participants were asked to think of and type three pieces of 
advice that they could give to someone who is going on vacation, but, as with the Control 
condition, they were given no information about the purpose of the feedback they were to 
receive shortly.  
As in Experiment 1, participants next saw their feedback, which was presented on a 
separate computer to allow the participants’ eye movements and fixations to be recorded with 
an eyetracker. Immediately after they finished reading the feedback, participants completed 
the mind-wandering filler task, which lasted approximately 5 minutes, before completing the 
AGQ—R (Elliot & Murayama, 2008). Participants subsequently completed the surprise recall 
test, followed by the adapted TFS, which assessed how often during the filler task they had 
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thought about the past or the future. The study finished with participants answering the same 
feedback rating questions as were used in Experiment 1. 
Data processing.  
Adherence to task instructions. Prior to receiving the feedback, two Control 
participants mistakenly wrote what they might see during the experiment, further, one wrote 
about what they saw on their way to the experiment. However, all other Control participants 
completed the control task properly. Likewise, all participants in the Advice condition wrote 
appropriate advice, and all those in the Goal-setting condition set relevant goals. All 
participants were included in the analysis. 
Memory coding. Both the memory data and the eye-tracking data were processed in 
the same way as in Experiment 1, with one researcher coding the free recall responses blind 
to condition. This time the coder was not blind to whether the participants had seen script 1 or 
script 2; however, they remained blind to which version of the script had been seen, and thus 
to the style in which each individual comment had been presented. Again, an independent 
coder also coded 20% of the data, and the agreement rates for all four measurements 
exceeded r = .86, therefore all analyses of recall were based on the first coder’s data. 
Results  
Participants’ appraisals of the feedback. Again, most participants appeared to 
believe that the feedback was personalised, with only seven of the 168 participants reporting 
that they suspected the feedback was generic. Participants rated the feedback highly in both 
fairness (M = 4.05 out of 5, SD = 0.89), and helpfulness (M = 4.15, SD = 0.71). They also 
believed that engaging with the feedback would allow them to do better in the future, as the 
estimated grade for the initial writing was 48.26% (SD = 13.57) whereas participants believed 
this could rise to 65.24% (SD = 12.79) if they completed the task again. No participant 
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correctly guessed the study’s aims when prompted, nor noted the differences in feedback 
style. Consistent with Experiment 1, 73% of participants reported at the end of the 
experiment that, in general, they preferred to receive directive feedback, whereas only 21% 
said they preferred to receive evaluative feedback (5% expressed no preference either way). 
Analysis of recall data. We conducted a 3 (between subjects: condition: Goal-setting 
vs. Advice-giving vs. Control) x 2 (within subjects: feedback type: evaluative vs. directive) x 
2 (within subjects: retrieval style accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) mixed-factor ANOVA on 
the number of feedback comments recalled. As Figure 3 shows, this analysis replicated the 
key patterns of findings demonstrated in Experiment 1, and previously by Nash et al. (2018). 
Specifically, participants recalled significantly more of the evaluative comments (M = 4.15, 
SD= 1.70) than of the directive comments (M = 3.08, SD = 1.63), F(1,165) = 28.84, p < .001, 
η2p = .15 (BFinclusion > 30). There was also a main effect of retrieval style accuracy, whereby 
participants recalled more feedback comments in the correct style (M = 4.51, SD = 1.67) than 
in the incorrect style (M = 2.73, SD = 1.55), F(1, 165) = 89.70, p < .001, η2p = .35 (BFinclusion 
> 30). Further, we found a significant interaction between feedback style and retrieval style 
accuracy, signifying an overall evaluative retrieval style, F(1, 165) = 41.14, p < .001, η2p = 
.20 (BFinclusion > 30). Planned follow-up paired t-tests showed that when participants recalled 
evaluative comments, they reproduced them in an evaluative style significantly more often 
(75% of the time) than in a directive style (25% of the time), t(167) = 9.42, p < .001, d = 0.73 
(BF10 > 30). In contrast, when participants recalled directive comments, they reproduced 
these in the correct, directive style (45% of the time) no more often than in the incorrect, 
evaluative style (55% of the time), t(167) = -1.59, p = .11, d = -0.12 (BF10 = 0.29). 
Figure 3 about here   
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Looking next to the effects of condition, we found that participants in all three groups 
recalled a similar number of feedback comments overall, F(2,165) = 0.54, p =.59, η2p < .01 
(BFinclusion = 0.03). There was also no significant interaction between condition and feedback 
type, F(2, 165) = 0.42, p =.66, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.04), nor a significant interaction 
between condition and retrieval style accuracy, F(2, 165) = 1.08, p =.34, η2p = .01 (BFinclusion 
= 0.06). The predicted three-way interaction between condition, feedback type, and retrieval 
style accuracy was also not statistically significant, F(2, 165) = 2.84, p = .06, η2p = .03, 
although the Bayesian analysis suggested strong evidence for this three-way effect (BFinclusion 
= 23.78). 
Analysis of attention data. There were 161 participants with valid eye-tracking data 
(52 Control; 53 Advice-giving; 56 Goal-setting). We separately analysed the two dependent 
variables (dwell time and run count) using two 3 (between subjects: condition) x 2 (within 
subjects: feedback type) mixed-factor ANOVAs. Looking first at dwell time, as illustrated in 
Figure 4a, we again found no significant main effect of feedback type, F(1, 158) = 0.02, p = 
.90, η2p < .001 (BFinclusion = 0.13), meaning that participants spent approximately equal time 
attending to evaluative comments (M =  239 ms/word, SD = 90 ms) and to directive 
comments (M = 239 ms/word, SD = 88 ms). There was also no significant main effect of 
condition, F(2, 158) = 0.27, p = .77, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.32), nor a significant interaction 
between condition and feedback type, F(2, 158) = 1.14, p = .32, η2p = .01 (BFinclusion = 0.16). 
These results suggest that the goal-setting and advice-giving interventions did not notably 
affect the attention that participants paid to the feedback. 
We next examined the run count data, finding no significant main effect of feedback 
type, F(1, 158) = 0.39, p = .54, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.15). Specifically, as Figure 4b shows, 
participants read evaluative comments (M = 0.98, SD = 0.33) and directive comments (M = 
0.97, SD = 0.32) an approximately equal number of times. There was also no significant main 
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effect of condition, F(2, 158) = 0.71, p =.50, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.40) nor a significant 
interaction between condition and feedback type, F(2, 158) = 0.92, p = .40, η2p =.01 
(BFinclusion = 0.11). 
Exploratory analyses. When looking at the recall data, our findings were the same 
regardless of whether participants had read feedback script 1, or our new script 2 (adding 
script as an additional between-subject variable, all p-values for effects involving script > .27, 
all BFinclusion ≤ 0.24). This outcome demonstrates further evidence for the replicability of the 
evaluative recall bias and evaluative retrieval style across different materials. 
Figure 4 about here  
We examined group differences in participants’ ratings of the feedback’s fairness and 
helpfulness, their grading of their actual and future performance, their AGQ-R scores, and the 
tendency for their spontaneous thoughts after reading the feedback to be future-oriented 
(calculated as TFS Future score minus TFS Past score). We also examined the extent to 
which individual participants’ TFS difference scores, AGQ-R scores, and their preference for 
evaluative vs. directive feedback were associated with their (1) evaluative recall bias, (2) 
evaluative retrieval style, and (3) selective attention toward evaluative feedback in terms of 
dwell time and run count. The results of these analyses are reported in supplemental 
materials, but again there were few effects of note. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the goal-setting manipulation had little 
influence on which feedback the participants went on to recall, though it did appear to 
influence the way in which the feedback was recalled (we return to look more closely at this 
effect later). However, setting explicit goals is only one way of leading people to explicitly 
consider their skill improvement. In Experiment 3 we used two different but related 
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manipulations that we believed could increase participants’ focus on improvement. Firstly, 
we asked participants—before they received the feedback—to reflect on either (a) past 
occasions when they had to use persuasive writing skills, (b) future occasions when they will 
have to use these skills, or (c) neither. According to research stemming from Future Time 
Perspective Theory, students’ mental orientation toward the future can reliably predict their 
goal motivation, goal-setting, and general academic engagement (Horstmanshof & Zimitat, 
2007; Husman & Lens, 1999; Lasane & Jones, 1999; Nuttin & Lens, 1985). According to this 
line of reasoning, thinking about one’s own future can encourage people to take decisions and 
actions that are of distal rather than only proximal benefit (see Prabhakar, Coughlin, & 
Ghetti, 2016). We therefore predicted that participants who focused on their future use of 
their writing skills would be less likely to exhibit an evaluative recall bias. Further, we also 
predicted that those who focused on their future use of writing skills would pay relatively 
greater attention to directive feedback, as measured by eyetracking. 
Secondly, in many real learning scenarios students will be motivated to improve 
because they want to obtain a specific grade. In Nash et al.’s (2018) work and in our 
Experiments 1 and 2, there was no clear evidence as to whether participants were truly 
motivated to improve in the fictional second writing task. As such, it is important to ask 
whether the evaluative recall bias and evaluative retrieval style would replicate in a scenario 
where motivation is known to be high. We might predict that the memory effects seen in our 
previous studies would disappear if task improvement were explicitly incentivised. For 
instance, it may be that when participants have a clear reason to wish to improve in a 
subsequent task, they would pay relatively more attention to, and remember, directive 
feedback comments. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we also added an incentive manipulation 
whereby half of participants were told that they could receive a monetary bonus based on 
how much their persuasive writing improved in a (fictional) second writing task.   
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Method 
 We pre-registered our method and analysis plan for Experiment 3, which can be found 
at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=c9z9au 
Participants and design.  
Based on a priori power analysis, we aimed to recruit 168 participants, but we slightly 
over-sampled and ultimately recruited 174 students, one of whom was excluded from 
analyses following our pre-registered protocol, due to not attempting to recall the feedback. 
The final sample of 173 participants took part in exchange for £10 or course credits, and 
comprised 133 females and 40 males, Mage = 20 yrs, SD = 3 yrs, range = 18 - 44. In the 
second session of the experiment, each participant was randomly assigned either to the 
Incentive condition or to the No Incentive condition. Orthogonally to this manipulation, each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of the three temporal focus conditions, thus 
resulting in six between subjects conditions: Control (n = 59; of which n = 30 in the Incentive 
condition, n = 29 in the No Incentive condition), Past (n = 57; of which n = 29 in the 
Incentive condition, n = 28 in the No Incentive condition) or Future (n = 57; of which n = 28 
in the Incentive condition, n = 29 in the No Incentive condition). 
Materials  
All materials matched those used in Experiment 2. Participants were presented at 
random with one of the two versions of our two different feedback scripts, and all participants 
completed the adapted TFS and our adapted version of the AGQ-R (Elliot & Murayama, 
2008). The filler task also matched that used in Experiment 2.  
Procedure.  
The procedure matched that of Experiment 2, except for a few small details, as follows.  
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Session 1. Participants signed up with the knowledge that they may receive a bonus of 
up to £5 plus the potential to win an additional £30 Amazon voucher. All other aspects were 
identical to Experiment 2.  
Session 2.  Unlike the previous experiments, we allowed participants to return for 
session 2 after a delay of anything between 1 day and 1 week.2 Most participants returned 
within 3 days of completing session 1 (96%; M = 1.69). At the beginning of session 2, 
participants were presented with a short task prior to seeing their feedback. The computer 
software pseudo-randomly assigned the participants to one of the three temporal focus 
conditions. In the Past condition participants were instructed to ‘take a few moments to think 
about the academic skills involved in the persuasive writing task. Then, using the boxes 
below, briefly describe three occasions in the past when you needed to use these skills’. In the 
Future condition participants were instructed to: ‘take a few moments to think about the 
academic skills involved in the persuasive writing task. Then, using the boxes below, briefly 
describe three occasions in the future when you will need to use these skills’. In the control 
condition the participants were simply asked to: ‘take a few moments to think about the 
academic skills involved in the persuasive writing task.’ They were given no information 
about the purpose of the feedback they were to receive shortly.  
Participants were then pseudo-randomly assigned to one of two incentivisation 
conditions. In the Incentive condition participants were told: In addition to your 
[payment/credits] for completing this survey, all participants who improve their writing in 
the second writing task will also receive a bonus of up to £5. The size of your bonus will 
depend on how fully you implement the feedback, as judged by our analysis of your writing. 
                                                          
2 The number of days between sessions was not meaningfully correlated (Spearman’s rho) with either 
the evaluative recall bias (r = -.07, p = .33), or the evaluative retrieval style (r = -.04, p = .63). 
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Additionally, the six participants who implement their feedback most fully will receive a £30 
Amazon voucher once we’ve completed the experiment in full. In contrast, participants in the 
No incentive condition were told: In addition to your [payment/credits] for completing this 
survey, all participants who complete this second session in full will now receive an extra £5, 
and be entered into a prize draw to win one of six £30 Amazon vouchers. In fact, all 
participants received an additional £5 at the end of the session and were entered into the prize 
draw. The participants were asked to rate using a sliding scale how motivated they were, on a 
scale of 0 (not motivated at all) to 10 (extremely motivated), to do better on the second 
writing task – note that this variable was not mentioned in our pre-registration. 
As in Experiment 2, participants next saw their feedback, presented on a separate 
computer to allow the participants’ eye movements and fixations to be recorded with an 
eyetracker. Immediately after they finished reading the feedback, participants completed the 
mind-wandering filler task, which lasted approximately 5 minutes. Participants then 
completed the AGQ—R (Elliot & Murayama, 2008) before completing the surprise recall 
test, followed by the adapted TFS, which assessed how often during the filler task they had 
thought about the past or the future. Participants then answered the feedback rating questions. 
Finally, as part of the debriefing participants were asked to recall which incentive condition 
they were in, so that it could be known whether or not they had properly read the instructions 
(this check was not mentioned in our pre-registration). Specifically, the experimenter asked 
them whether they had read the text explaining this, and to briefly reiterate what it had said, 
and prompted them with further questions if they were unsure what was being asked. We 
were particularly interested to ensure that Incentive participants did remember their 
instruction, whereas it was relatively unimportant whether or not No Incentive participants 
remembered their instruction.   
Data processing.  
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Adherence to task instructions. The responses of participants in the Past and Future 
conditions were checked to ensure they had written about their past or future use of skills, 
respectively. All participants were judged to have completed the task properly. 
Memory coding. Both the memory data and the eye-tracking data were processed in 
the same way as in Experiment 2, with one researcher coding the free recall responses blind 
to condition and script version, but not blind to script. Again, an independent coder also 
coded 20% of the data, and the agreement rates for all four measurements exceeded r = .85, 
therefore all analyses of recall were based on the first coder’s data.  
Results  
Participants’ appraisals of the feedback. Most participants appeared to believe that 
the feedback was personalised, with only one reporting that they suspected the feedback was 
generic. Participants rated the feedback highly in both fairness (M = 4.09 out of 5, SD = 
0.94), and helpfulness (M = 4.30, SD = 0.71). They also believed that engaging with the 
feedback would allow them to do better in the future, as the estimated grade for the initial 
writing was 51.75% (SD = 12.76) whereas participants believed this could rise to 66.42% (SD 
= 10.24) if they completed the task again. Again, no participants correctly guessed the study’s 
aims when prompted, nor noted the differences in feedback style. Consistent with the 
previous studies, 83% of participants reported at the end of the experiment that, in general, 
they preferred to receive directive feedback, whereas only 13% said they preferred to receive 
evaluative feedback (4% expressed no preference either way). 
Incentive information and motivation ratings. When all participants were included in 
analyses, the incentive did not significantly influence participants’ motivation ratings: 
Incentive condition (M = 7.47 out of 10, SD = 2.03) compared to the No Incentive condition 
(M = 6.94, SD = 1.79), t(169) = 1.81, p = .07, d = 0.28 (BF10 = 0.75). However, of those 
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participants in the Incentive condition, nine reported no recollection of the incentive. When 
these nine participants’ ratings were removed from analysis we found that participants were 
significantly more motivated in the Incentive condition (M = 7.70, SD = 1.97) than those in 
the No Incentive condition, t(160) = 2.57, p = .01, d = 0.40 (BF10 = 3.44). All remaining 
analyses were nevertheless conducted with all participants included, as per our pre-registered 
plan; however we note that excluding these nine participants (which was not part of our plan) 
made no difference to any of the main findings in terms of statistical significance. 
Analysis of recall data. We conducted a 2 (between subjects: incentivisation: 
Incentive vs No Incentive) x 3 (between subjects: temporal focus: control vs. past vs. future) 
x 2 (within subjects: feedback type: evaluative vs. directive) x 2 (within subjects: retrieval 
style accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) mixed-factor ANOVA on the number of feedback 
comments recalled. As Figure 5 shows, this analysis replicated the key patterns of findings 
demonstrated previously, whereby participants recalled significantly more of the evaluative 
comments (M = 3.84, SD = 1.77) than of the directive comments (M = 2.95, SD = 1.38), 
F(1,167) = 24.06, p < .001, η2p = .13 (BFinclusion > 30). There was also a main effect of 
retrieval style accuracy, whereby participants recalled more feedback comments in the correct 
style (M = 4.40, SD = 1.86) than in the incorrect style (M = 2.49, SD = 1.50), F(1, 167) = 
94.49, p < .001, η2p = .36 (BFinclusion > 30). Further, we found a significant interaction 
between feedback style and retrieval style accuracy, signifying an overall evaluative retrieval 
style, F(1, 167) = 31.03, p < .001, η2p = .16 (BFinclusion > 30). As seen previously, planned 
follow-up paired t-tests showed that when participants recalled evaluative comments, they 
reproduced them in an evaluative style significantly more often (75% of the time) than in a 
directive style (25% of the time), t(172) = 9.18, p < .001, d = 0.70 (BF10 > 30). In contrast, 
when participants recalled directive comments, they reproduced these in the correct, directive 
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style (50% of the time) no more often than in the incorrect, evaluative style (50% of the 
time), t(172) = -0.12, p = .90, d = -0.01 (BF10 = 0.09).  
Looking next to the effects of incentivisation, we found that participants in both 
incentivisation groups recalled a similar number of feedback comments overall, F(1,167) = 
1.12, p =.29, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.11). Importantly, there was also no significant 
interaction between incentivisation and feedback type, F(1, 167) = 0.76, p =.38, η2p <.01 
(BFinclusion = 0.22), nor a significant interaction between incentivisation and retrieval style 
accuracy, F(1, 167) = 1.64, p =.20, η2p = .01 (BFinclusion = 0.19), nor a three-way interaction 
between incentivisation, feedback type, and retrieval style accuracy, F(1, 167) = 0.24, p = 
.63, η2p = .01 BFinclusion = 0.22). In other words, incentivisation had no meaningful effect on 
either the evaluative recall bias or the evaluative retrieval style.  
Looking to the effects of temporal focus, we found that participants in the three 
conditions recalled a similar number of feedback comments overall, F(2,167) = 0.60, p =.55, 
η2p <.01 (BFinclusion =0.02). There was also no significant interaction between temporal focus 
condition and feedback type, F(2, 167) = 0.59, p = .56, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.04), nor a 
significant interaction between temporal focus condition and retrieval style accuracy, F(2, 
167) = 0.29, p =.74, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.04), nor a three-way interaction between 
temporal focus condition, feedback type, and retrieval style accuracy, F(2, 167) = 0.55, p = 
.57, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion =0.17). In other words, asking participants to focus on their past or 
future use of writing skills had no meaningful effect on either the evaluative recall bias or the 
evaluative retrieval style. 
Figure 5 about here  
Finally, there was no significant interaction between incentivisation and temporal 
focus condition; F(2, 167) = 0.59, p = .55, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.05), nor any further three- 
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or four-way interactions of these two variables with feedback type and/or retrieval style 
accuracy, all p > .32 (all BFinclusion ≤ 0.44). 
Analysis of attention data. There were 161 participants with valid eye-tracking data: 
(Control; Incentive n = 28, No Incentive n = 26; Past; Incentive, n = 26, No Incentive, n =27; 
Future; Incentive, n = 26, No Incentive, n = 28). We separately analysed the two dependent 
variables (dwell time and run count) using two 2 (incentivisation) x 3 (temporal focus 
condition) x 2 (feedback type) mixed-factor ANOVAs. Looking first at the dwell time data, 
as depicted in Table 1, here we did find a significant main effect of feedback type, F(1, 155) 
= 4.45, p = .04, η2p = .03 (BFinclusion = 2.01); interestingly, participants spent significantly 
more time attending to directive comments (M = 268 ms/word, SD = 122 ms) than to 
evaluative comments (M = 260 ms/word, SD = 121 ms), although in Bayesian terms the 
evidence for this effect is only anecdotal. There were no other statistically significant effects: 
incentivisation, F(1, 155) = 1.02, p = .31, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.58); temporal focus 
condition, F(2, 155) = 0.14, p = .89, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.35); incentivisation x feedback 
type, F(1, 155) = 0.89, p = .35, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.29); temporal focus condition x 
feedback type, F(2, 155) = 0.74, p = .48, η2p < .01(BFinclusion = 0.12); incentivisation x 
temporal focus condition x feedback type, F(2, 155) = 0.65, p = .52, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 
0.06).  
We next examined the run count data, also depicted in Table 1. Here we again found a 
significant main effect of feedback type, F(1, 155) = 4.78, p = .03, η2p = .03 (BFinclusion = 
1.89), whereby participants read directive comments significantly more times (M = 
1.08/word, SD = 0.39) than evaluative comments (M = 1.05/word, SD = 0.39), again this is 
anecdotal evidence in Bayesian terms. There were no other significant effects: 
incentivisation, F(1, 155) = 1.89, p = .17, η2p =.01 (BFinclusion = 0.58); temporal focus 
condition, F(2, 155) = 0.29, p = .75, η2p < .01(BFinclusion = 0.39); incentivisation x feedback 
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type, F(1, 155) = 1.48, p = .23, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion = 0.36); temporal focus condition x 
feedback type, F(2, 155) = 2.06, p = .13, η2p = .03 (BFinclusion = 0.39); incentivisation x 
temporal focus condition x feedback type, F(2, 155) = 0.47, p = .63, η2p < .01 (BFinclusion  = 
0.13). We return to look more closely at the data across studies shortly.   
Table 1 about here 
Exploratory analyses. As before, we examined group differences in participants’ 
ratings of the feedback’s fairness and helpfulness, their grading of their actual and future 
performance, their AGQ-R scores, and the tendency for their spontaneous thoughts after 
reading the feedback to be future-oriented (calculated as TFS Future score minus TFS Past 
score). We also examined the extent to which individual participants’ motivation ratings, TFS 
difference scores, AGQ-R scores, and their preference for evaluative vs. directive feedback 
were associated with their (1) evaluative recall bias, (2) evaluative retrieval style, and (3) 
selective attention toward evaluative feedback in terms of dwell time and run count. The 
results of these analyses are reported in supplemental materials. Again there were few effects 
of note, and in particular it is important to note that participants’ motivation ratings were not 
correlated significantly with the evaluative recall bias, r (N = 169) = .08, p = .32 (BF10 = 
0.16). However, it is also interesting to note that these motivation ratings were correlated 
significantly and negatively with the evaluative retrieval style, r (N = 169) = -.18, p = .02 
(BF10 = 2.56). This finding, though anecdotal and not predicted a priori, fits well with the 
earlier finding that our goal-setting manipulation reduced the evaluative retrieval style.  
Effect size analysis 
 As a means to reach the most precise size estimates of the effects observed across 
Experiments 1-3, and thus to reach the most robust conclusions that these datasets can offer, 
we conducted a series of random effects mini-metaanalyses (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). 
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As the top half of Table 2 shows, looking first at the overall data for each experiment, the 
combined effect size estimate for the evaluative recall bias was medium in size (d = 0.45), 
somewhat smaller than the effect size of d = 0.63 [0.48, 0.77] estimated by Nash et al. (2018). 
The estimated size of the evaluative retrieval style was similar, at d = 0.48. Importantly 
though, and despite the significant differences observed in Experiment 3, there was little 
evidence across experiments of an ‘evaluative attentional bias’, with the combined effect size 
estimates for the two attentional measures being very small (d = -0.11 and -0.07 for dwell 
time and run count, respectively). 
Because we used the same between subject manipulations in Experiments 1 and 2, we 
also conducted mini-metaanalyses of these two studies to assess the overall effects of goal-
setting. Looking to the bottom half of Table 2, the effect of the goal-setting manipulation 
(relative to control participants) on the evaluative recall bias was very small, but its effect on 
the evaluative retrieval style differed statistically from zero, such that goal-setting 
significantly attenuated this retrieval style bias.3 Goal-setting had no meaningful effect on 
participants’ relative attention to evaluative over directive feedback comments. 
Table 2 about here 
General Discussion 
                                                          
3 Note that in Table 2, the 95% CI for the effect of goal-setting on the evaluative retrieval style in 
Experiment 2 excludes zero, whereas in our main analyses of Experiment 2, the corresponding 
omnibus three-way interaction effect was not statistically significant at α = .05. This is because the 
latter analysis included data from the Advice-giving condition, whereas the former only compares the 
Goal-setting and Control conditions. 
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For feedback to be used effectively and to therefore enhance our learning, we must 
often be able to retrieve it from memory at a later time. Our present findings replicate and 
extend those of Nash et al. (2018), demonstrating robustly that people recall evaluative 
feedback comments more readily than they recall directive feedback comments.  
A key way in which these experiments extend the prior work is by obtaining direct, 
objective measures of attention during participants’ engagement with the feedback. Looking 
at the combined data across the three experiments, we found that participants spent 
approximately equal amounts of time focusing on evaluative comments and directive 
comments, and read both types an equivalent number of times, even though they were 
subsequently able to recall the former type of feedback far more often. These findings 
therefore offer the first direct evidence that basic attentional differences are unlikely to 
account for the evaluative recall bias. Of course, reading times are not the only form of 
attentional encoding, and it remains possible that other differences may be implicated in the 
evaluative recall bias; for instance, participants may engage in deeper or more elaborative 
processing when reading evaluative feedback. Nevertheless, the lack of support here for an 
attentional account adds further evidence against the causal role of encoding processes in 
general, and therefore provides greater reason to look instead to retrieval processes for an 
explanation. For instance, one possibility is that when attempting to retrieve advice or 
feedback from memory, people tend to selectively search their memories for information that 
relates to prior performance. This might occur if people generally think of feedback as being 
evaluative information, and therefore engage in schema-driven retrieval processes that lead 
them to systematically neglect information that concerns future improvement. If people’s 
mental schemas do indeed often represent feedback as being evaluative, then this might also 
neatly explain why participants tend to show an evaluative retrieval style when remembering 
feedback. That is to say, these schemas may provide the basis for Gricean implicatures, 
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whereby “do X better next time” is taken intuitively to mean, “I did X poorly this time”. We 
are currently investigating these possibilities.  
The strong evidence of no difference in the time taken to read evaluative vs. directive 
feedback, even despite a strong evaluative bias in recall, is particularly interesting in light of 
the boom in learning analytics research that relies on reading time data (e.g. Ada & 
Stansfield, 2017; Greller & Drachsler, 2012; Hatala et al., 2015; Kovanović et al., 2015; 
Nguyen, Tempelaar, Rienties, & Giesbers, 2016). In many such cases, measures of students’ 
engagement with learning environments are inferred from covertly recorded, computerized 
data, such as the total time they have spent reading specific educational documents or 
instructions (Hatala et al., 2015; Zimbardi et al., 2017). What our present data clearly 
illustrate, though, is that even when two different kinds of information receive almost 
identical exposure in terms of students’ reading time, there can still be sizeable differences in 
the students’ cognitive engagement between these two kinds of information. Clearly, it is 
important not to conflate learners’ reading time with their engagement. 
The present experiments also extend the prior work by examining the effects of 
different manipulations, prior to receiving feedback, designed to lead participants to give 
greater thought to the prospect of improving their skills. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found 
that our goal-setting intervention had no statistically significant influence on the evaluative 
recall bias; nor did it influence the amount of feedback recalled overall. Therefore, despite 
goal-setting interventions being a successful method for improving performance in many 
tasks and for promoting a directive, future-oriented mindset (e.g. Latham & Locke, 1991; 
Locke & Latham, 2002; Morisano et al., 2010), there was no evidence that this simple goal-
setting intervention improved the retention of feedback. These data therefore suggest that the 
evaluative recall bias is not easily attributed to participants merely being inadequately 
focused upon improvement.  
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The goal-setting intervention, however, did have a slightly different effect: our mini-
metaanalysis shows that, as we had predicted, participants in the goal-setting groups showed 
a smaller evaluative retrieval style than did those in the control groups. Although they still 
recalled more evaluative feedback than directive feedback, the goal-setting participants were 
more likely than control participants to recall their feedback as suggestions for future 
improvement, rather than as critique of their past performance. Prior research has shown that 
goal-setting can improve students’ academic performance, with those who engaged in a goal-
setting intervention achieving better grades, better management of workload, and decreased 
negative affect (Morisano et al., 2010). It is possible, then that in setting goals, our own 
participants were more likely to process improvement-based feedback as having a directive, 
supportive intention, rather than as being a judgmental commentary on their performance.  
Unfortunately, in Experiment 2 when we attempted to test two competing 
interpretations of this finding, the data were insufficiently clear to allow us to confidently rule 
out either interpretation. However, Experiment 3 offers suggestive evidence for a role of 
motivational factors, insofar that those participants who gave higher subjective motivation 
ratings tended to exhibit weaker evaluative retrieval styles. In broader terms, the fact that the 
goal-related factors had some apparent influence on the evaluative retrieval style, but not the 
evaluative recall bias, supports Nash et al.’s (2018) conclusions that the former is much more 
susceptible than the latter to contextual factors. It is an open question whether attenuating the 
evaluative retrieval style—whether via goal-setting or via other means—would be desirable 
in practice, insofar as doing so could have consequences for students’ attitudes to learning, 
motivation, or acceptance of feedback. We do know, though, that people typically perceive 
evaluative feedback as more negative than directive feedback, and also that students typically 
prefer to receive directive rather than evaluative feedback (Nash et al., 2018). Therefore, it 
seems important that even when people successfully recall their directive feedback, they 
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typically recall it in an evaluative style: this bias could reasonably lead people to believe that 
they have not been given the feedback they want, and could perhaps even affect the feedback-
receiver’s self-esteem or their interpersonal relationship with the feedback-giver. These 
matters merit attention in future work. 
To extend these findings using different techniques for influencing participants’ 
improvement focus, in Experiment 3 we prompted participants to reflect either on how they 
would use their persuasive writing skills in the future, or how they have used these skills in 
the past (or neither). This manipulation had no meaningful influence on the evaluative recall 
bias, and unlike our goal-setting manipulation, it also had no apparent effect on participants’ 
retrieval styles. In Experiment 3 we also tested the influence of an incentive to improve on 
these memory biases. This was an important question to address, as students are often 
motivated to do well in their real assignments in a way that is difficult to emulate in 
laboratory studies. The financial incentive we used in Experiment 3 had only a modest effect 
on participants’ self-reported motivation to improve their writing, and there was no evidence 
that it had any effect on either of the memory biases of interest. Whereas stronger incentives 
and motivational manipulations would clearly be valuable for future research, it is 
noteworthy that even in the No Incentive condition, participants claimed to be quite 
motivated to improve, and so these results provide further confidence that the evaluative 
recall bias is not merely a result of participants being disinterested in improving. The fact that 
the evaluative recall bias was not correlated with participants’ subjective motivation ratings 
provides further evidence to this end. This finding also fits with those from other research, 
which demonstrates that incentivising memory performance does not generally lead to 
meaningful improvements (Kang & Pashler, 2014; Ngaosuvan & Mäntylä, 2005; Wehe, 
Rhodes, & Seger, 2015). Overall, the Experiment 3 data therefore add further indications that 
the evaluative recall bias could generalize to more realistic contexts in which individuals are 
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motivated to learn from their feedback – this is a key issue that we are currently exploring 
further by taking our data collection out of the lab and into real classrooms.  
Overall, the findings of these studies are highly relevant to educational practitioners. 
Whereas students typically prefer directive feedback, and whereas directive feedback is 
typically considered more valuable to learners than is evaluative feedback, our findings lend 
weight to a striking caveat: simply preparing feedback comments in a future-oriented style 
can make them less likely to be remembered. In real-world learning contexts, this bias in 
remembering could plausibly lead to students being less able to learn from and remedy their 
mistakes in future, at least when they receive future-oriented feedback without concrete, 
practical instructions on exactly what steps to take next, when, and how. Whereas the 
mechanism behind the evaluative recall bias still remains unidentified, these three 
experiments—by testing certain attentional and goal-based accounts of the bias, and by 
demonstrating conditions under which it can be observed—bring us closer to understanding 
this counterintuitive effect. 
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style accuracy and experimental condition. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals, 
calculated separately for each between-subject experimental condition (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 2. Attention toward evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 1, split according to 
retrieval style accuracy and experimental condition. Panel A represents mean dwell time data; Panel B 
represents mean run count data. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals, calculated 
separately for each between-subject experimental condition (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 3. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 2, split according to retrieval 
style accuracy and experimental condition. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals, 
calculated separately for each between-subject experimental condition (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 4. Attention toward evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 2, split according to 
retrieval style accuracy and experimental condition. Panel A represents mean dwell time data; Panel B 
represents mean run count data. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals, calculated 
separately for each between-subject experimental condition (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 5. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback by the No Incentive group (Panel A) and the 
Incentive group (Panel B) in Experiment 3, split according to retrieval style accuracy and 
experimental condition. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals, calculated separately 
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Table 1. Mean dwell time and run count for evaluative and directive feedback comments 
across each between-subject condition in Experiment 3 (standard deviations in parentheses). 
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Table 2. Effect size estimates for the key outcome measures 
 Outcome measure Experiment Effect size d 
[95% CI] 
Overall effect 
size estimate (all 
data) 
Evaluative recall bias Experiment 1 0.63 [0.44, 0.82] 
 Experiment 2 0.42 [0.26, 0.57] 
 Experiment 3 0.38 [0.22, 0.53] 
 Metaanalytic effect 0.45 [0.32, 0.61] 
Evaluative retrieval style Experiment 1 0.56 [0.38, 0.75] 
 Experiment 2 0.49 [0.33, 0.65] 
 Experiment 3 0.42 [0.27, 0.58] 
 Metaanalytic effect 0.48 [0.39, 0.58] 
Evaluative attentional 
bias (dwell time) 
Experiment 1 -0.14 [-0.33, 0.04] 
Experiment 2 0.01 [-0.14, 0.17] 
Experiment 3 -0.19 [-0.34, -
0.04] 
Metaanalytic effect -0.11 [-0.23, 0.02] 
Evaluative attentional 
bias (run count) 
Experiment 1 -0.07 [-0.25, 0.12] 
Experiment 2 0.05 [-0.10, 0.21] 
Experiment 3 -0.19 [-0.34, -
0.03] 








Evaluative recall bias Experiment 1 0.12 [-0.22, 0.47] 
 Experiment 2 0.08 [-0.29, 0.45] 
 Metaanalytic effect 0.10 [-0.15, 0.36] 
Evaluative retrieval style Experiment 1 -0.44 [-0.79, -
0.09] 
 Experiment 2 -0.43 [-0.81, -
0.06] 
 Metaanalytic effect -0.44 [-0.69, -
0.18] 
Evaluative attentional 
bias (dwell time) 
Experiment 1 -0.13 [-0.50, 0.24] 
Experiment 2 0.16 [-0.22, 0.53] 
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Metaanalytic effect 0.01 [-0.27, 0.29] 
Evaluative attentional 
bias (run count) 
Experiment 1 -0.01 [-0.37, 0.36] 
Experiment 2 0.20 [-0.18, 0.58] 
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experimental condition. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals, calculated separately 
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